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the Wyoming Law. In the Matter of Parental Rights to X, Y and Z, DS
v. Dept. of Public Assistance & Social Services, 607 P.2d 911 (Wyo.
1980).

The county attorney of Sheridan County petitioned the
district court at Sheridan on April 3, 1978 to terminate the
parental rights of DS and RS to three minor children - X,
a three year old, and Y and Z, six month old twins. The
action was brought under the Wyoming Statutes pertaining
to the judicial termination of parental rights.1 Temporary
custody was awarded to the Sheridan County Department of
Public Assistance and Social Services, (D-PASS), and a
trial initiated by the county attorney's petition followed.
On July 6, 1978, the district court awarded custody of the
three children to D-PASS and ordered a review of the
decision within one year.2
In May of 1979, DS and RS moved the court for a
review of its July 6, 1978 decision. The parents waived
whatever rights they had to seek reconsideration of termination of parental rights to Y and Z, claiming that the
twins suffered health problems which required medical and
other special treatment that they (the parents) could not
provide.
With respect to X, however, DS and RS sought to prove
that their situation had improved, and more importantly,
that the State had not and could not show that the child
had been neglected. After hearing the evidence on these
issues, the district court ordered that the parental rights of
DS and RS be finally terminated. On appeal to the Wyoming
Supreme Court, the district court's decision was reversed.
In the course of its decision, the court noted that a
standard had not yet been defined against which a claim of
parental abuse or neglect sufficient to justify the termination
Copyright© 1981 by the University of Wyoming

1. WYO. STAT. §§ 14-2-301 through 307 (1977).
2. In the Matter of Parental Rights to X, Y and Z, DS v. Dept. of Public
Assistance & Social Services, 607 P.2d 911, 917 (Wyo. 1980). [Hereinafter
cited in text as XYZ]. The trial court's order was somewhat unusual in
this situation in "terminating" parental rights, yet allowing a review
of the decision within one year. The Wyoming Supreme Court resolved
the inconsistency by holding that the 1978 proceeding was in the nature
of a temporary hearing and that the July 6, 1978 order must be considered
as a temporary order.
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of parental rights was to be examined. Because of the absence
of such a standard, and also in light of the "delicate nature"
of parental-rights-termination matters, the court announced
its intention to "seize upon this opportunity to establish, for
bench and bar, guides and standards which will, hopefully,
point the way in this and future cases. '
The gist of the court's holding was that a trial judge
must "strictly scrutinize" a claim of abuse or neglect before
terminating parental rights since parental rights embody a
fundamental liberty.4 Furthermore, in specific regard to
"abuse" and "neglect" standards, the court held that to
survive a strict scrutiny test, the State must prove that the
abuse or neglect poses "a serious danger to the child's
or mental well-being, i.e. clearly detrimental to the
physical
5
child."
This Note first considers the contextual framework
within which XYZ was decided. Specifically, attention is
given to the statutes, Wyoming precedent, and the tension
present in cases of this type between protecting the parents'
rights as opposed to emphasizing the best interests of the
child.
Secondly, the XYZ decision itself will be analyzed. It
is suggested that the court's approach to the issue of establishing standards was not perfectly logical, and consequently
there are certain structural defects in the court's line of
reasoning. While the court's mode of analysis might create
some uncertainty, the substantive standards themselves
clearly reflect the court's strong stance in favor of parent's
rights.
BACKGROUND ISSUES RELATING TO THE XYZ

DECISION

The Statutes
Wyoming enacted statutes in 1955 conferring on the
courts the power to sever the parent-child relationship."
Prior to the enactment of the statutes, there was no common
8.
4.
5.
6.

Id. at 917.
Id. at 918, 919.
Id. at 919.
1955 Wyo. SEss. LAws Ch. 169.
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law or statutory provision whereby the State or petitioners
in adoption could obtain irrevocable custody of an abused
or neglected child without consent of the parents.' At the
time, Wyoming was one of the few states to have enacted
such a law, and it was characterized as a "progressive
piece of legislation."'
The statutory provisions upon which the dispute in
XYZ was based are substantially the same as they existed
in the original enactment. The pertinent provisions provide
as follows:
Wyoming Statutes Section 14-2-301:
Any parent who abandons a child ...

or abuses or

neglects a child may have his permanent care, control and custody of the child transferred to some
other person, agency or institution and may have
all his parental rights to the child terminated.'
Wyoming Statutes Section 14-2-306:
(a) After the hearing, if the court determines it
is the best interest of the child that parental rights
of his parents be terminated, the court shall appoint
a suitable person to serve as guardian of the child.
(b) If any child is abandoned, neglected or abused
by one (1) parent, only the rights of the parent at
fault may be terminated.' °
Some indication of the legislature's intent regarding
the law might be inferred from a report of the Wyoming
Youth Commission, the group that proposed the legislation,
which indicated that the statute was designed to reach the
"flagrant cases of unfit parents."" Also, according to an
Attorney General's opinion issued shortly after the enactment of the statute, "The State, by its laws and through its
courts, will interfere with the parent-child relationship only
when the welfare of the child requires it, and acts which
terminate parental rights will be strictly construed."'"
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Note, Termination of ParentalRights, 13 Wyo. L. J. 185, 186 (1958).
Id. at 185.
WYO. STAT. § 14-2-301 (1977).
WYO. STAT. § 14-2-306 (1977).
Report of the Wyoming Youth Council (1955-1957 Biennium) p.r.
116 Op. ATT'Y. GEN. 638, 639 (1956), citing Virtue, BASIC STRUCTURE OF
CHILDREN'S SERVICES at 161 (1953).
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Both of these statements indicate that the intent of
the legislature was to invoke the power of the State only
as a last resort, and therefore the statutes were apparently
not intended to upset the traditional right of parents to raise
their children without unwarranted interference from the
State. The basis for this conclusion is strengthened when
one considers the passage of the Act in its historical context.1" As noted above, in 1955 very few states had passed
such a law and there is nothing to indicate that Wyoming
lawmakers had in mind an extreme departure from Wyoming's past practice or from the prevailing law as it existed
in the other states.
Unfortunately, a general statement of policy considerations is an insufficient guide to judges, legal practitioners
and D-PASS professionals when confronted with the problem
of actually administering the law. One notes that the statute
does not define "abuse" or "neglect," nor does it make reference to the specific types of parental conduct or behavior
that justify the State's intervention. Wyoming's approach
is not unique in this regard. In fact, one commentator notes,
"Most state statutes define neglect in broad, vague language,14
which would seem to allow virtually unlimited intervention.'

He adds that the difficulty with this type of statute is,
"[b]ecause the statutes do not reflect a considered analysis
of what types of harm justify the risks of intervention,
decisionmaking is left to the ad hoc analysis of social workers
and judges."' The deficiencies of the Wyoming statutes,
particularly as they relate to the last quotation cited above,
become apparent when one analyzes the case precendent on
the Act prior to the XYZ decision.
Wyoming Precedent
The court in XYZ had little in the way of precedent to
guide (or impede) their determination of appropriate standards. Only two cases involving the Termination-of-Parental13. For an overview of the premises upon which state intervention for the
protection of children has been based, see'Wald, State Intervention on
Behalf of "Neglected" Children: A Search for Realistic Standards, 27
STANFORD L. REV. 985 (1975).
14. Id. at 1000.
15. Id. at 1001.
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Rights statutes had come before the Wyoming Supreme
Court prior to the XYZ case.
The first case, In re Shreve,'" was an appeal of an order
removing five children from the custody of their natural
mother. The mother urged, among other things, that the
evidence produced by the State was insufficient to support
the decision of the trial court. Most notable in the context
of this discussion is the fact that the court did not give any
reasons for upholding the trial court's order other than a
finding that the evidence, on the whole, was sufficient to
"make out a case for the State and to disclose that [the
mother] had neglected the children.""
The second case, Matter of C.M.,' 8 was an appeal of
termination of parental rights to the infant child of mentally
retarded parents. A principal contention of the parents was
that the State must provide "clear and convincing evidence"
or "clear and satisfactory evidence" of neglect in a termination-of-parental-rights proceeding rather than a "preponderance of the evidence."' 9 The parents also argued that
under either standard, the lower court erred either by
applying a preponderance of the evidence standard or by
20
handing down a decision against the weight of the evidence.
The court dismissed the distinction between the different
standards of proof as "merely a play on words," and at
least implied that a preponderance of the evidence would
suffice in this type of case. 2' After stating that "No two
cases of this type are alike, and each must be decided on the
basis of its own facts," the court proceeded to engage in a
close analysis of the facts. 2
The holdings in both of these cases illustrate why it was
vitally important for the court in XYZ to establish guides
and standards. The Matter of C.M. decision, where the court
16. In re Shreve, 432 P.2d 271 (Wyo. 1967).

17. Id. at 273.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Matter of C.M., 556 P.2d 514 (Wyo. 1976).
Id. at 518.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 519.
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failed to adequately address the standard of proof issue and
endorsed an ad hoc approach to resolving the parent's rights
to their child, is particularly bothersome. But neither of the
decisions narrowed the broad statutory language or discussed
in a significant manner the nature of the rights involved.
Parental Rights vs. Best Interests of the Child
In determinations of whether or not to terminate a
parent's rights to retain the custody of a child, two competing arguments are often before the courts-the "parental
rights" doctrine, and the "best interests of the child" doctrine. 3 As will be shown, which approach the court chooses
to emphasize will have a significant impact on the issues
considered relevant and possibly on the ultimate outcome of
a particular case.
According to one commentator, the "parental right"
doctrine holds that "a biological parent is entitled to
custody of the child unless he is affirmatively shown to
be unfit." 4 In other words, the presumption is in favor of
the parent, and the State must meet the required burden of
proof regarding the parent's unfitness if it is going to intervene on the child's behalf.
With the "best interests" approach, at least theoretically,
parental unfitness is not an indispensable requisite to the
termination of parental rights. 5 In determining the "best
interests of the child" in the context of a dispute between
the parents and a third party, it has been noted that the
courts evaluate any of a large number of factors including
"moral fitness of the competing parties; the comparative
physical environments offered by the parties; the emotional
ties of the child to the parties and the parties to the child;
the desirability of maintaining the existing relationship
between the child and the26 third party; and the articulated
preference of the child."
23. Note, Alternatives to "ParentalRight" in Child Custody Disputes Involving

Third Parties,73 YALE L. J. 151, 152 (1963).
24. Id. at 153.
25. Id. at 156.
26. Id. at 153.
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Rather than considering the two approaches as being
mutually exclusive, it is advised that one visualize them as
points along a continuum. At one extreme, a purist of the
"parental rights" doctrine would argue that an inquiry into
impertinent until it
the child's best interest is completely 27
can be shown that the parent is unfit. Of course, within
the "parental rights" doctrine, there is considerable room
for disagreement as to what type of conduct or behavior
will justify finding a parent "unfit." As the standard which
is sufficient to reach a finding of "unfitness" become less
stringent, the "parental rights" test becomes more akin to
a "best interests" approach.
Under a pure "best interests" test, the child's welfare
8
is the paramount consideration. The "best interests" approach questions the presumption in favor of biological
parents, and relies extensively upon psychological studies
and the increasing knowledge in the area of child development in reaching a conclusion that a consideration of the
upon a finding of
child's welfare should not be contingent
29
"unfitness" on the part of parents.
As the continuum suggests, it is not always clear that
a court or statute adopts one approach at the exclusion of
the other. Indeed, most statutes articulate the "best interests
of the child" as a primary factor to be evaluated in the decision to terminate parental rights." Experience has shown,
however, that both legislatures and the courts have placed
primary emphasis on the rights of parents in termination
cases.3 Nevertheless, it is important to note that the "best
interests" doctrine has gained considerable support in recent
years. "
on the
27. Note, Termination of Parental Rights in Adoption Cases: Focusing
Child, 14 J. FAM. LAW 547 (1975-76).

28. Id. at 550-558.
Parental
29. Boskey and McCue, Alternative Standards For the Termination of
Rights, 9 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 4 (1978).
30. Id. at 4.
31. Id.
32. id. at 1-5.
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THE XYZ DECISION

The Court's Analysis
The principal issue before the court in XYZ was whether
or not the evidence justified the district court's termination
of the parental rights of DS and RS and its refusal to modify
that decision. At the outset, the court was presented with a
problem of statutory construction.
Under Section 14-2-306 (a), power is granted to terminate the parental rights of a child's parents "if the court
determines it is in the best interest of the child." Yet Sections
14-2-301 and 14-2-306 (b) require a finding of abandonment,
abuse or neglect. The question was how to harmonize the
"best interest" language with the abandonment, abuse or
neglect standards. The court concluded that the parent's
unfitness (that is, a showing of abandoment, neglect or
abuse) is a threshold question to be proved by the State,
and the best interest of the child be considered only insofar
as it relates to protecting the child from the proven abuse
or neglect of the parents.33
The court then turned to the parent's challenge to the
sufficiency of the State's evidence, and determined that a
standard must be established to point the way in this and
future cases. The principal support which the court relied
upon in formulating a standard came from the area of
34
constitutional law.
First, it was recognized that the right to associate with
one's family is a fundamental liberty protected by the state
and federal constitutions." The court then noted that in
analyzing legislative classifications, it has held that if a
fundamental liberty interest is infringed the classification
will be subject to strict scrutiny.3 " In deciding that this prin33. In the Matter of Parental Rights to X, Y and Z, supra note 2, at 917.
34. Id. at 918, 919.
85. Id. at 918 citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) ; Washakie County
School District Number One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980) ; Matter
of Adoption of Voss, 550 P.2d 481 (Wyo. 1976); and In re Adoption of
Strausser, 65 Wyo. 98, 196 P.2d 862 (1948).
36. Id. at 918, citing Washakie County School District Number One, supra note
35; and also referring to San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
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ciple was applicable to the case at hand, the court reasoned
that although the constitutionality of the parental-rightstermination statute was not at issue in XYZ, the same considerations which require strict scrutiny of the statute should
7
also require strict scrutiny of the statute's application.
An insight into the nature of the substantive standards
which were to be promulgated in XYZ became evident when
the court applied its reasoning on the constitutional issues
as follows:
In other words, the trial judge trying a parental
rights termination case must strictly scrutinize a
claim of abuse or neglect or abandonment before
terminating parental rights (a fundamental liberty). The trial judge is not free to terminate
parental rights merely because the State or other
petitioner shows that it is more probable than not
that the natural parent is abusing or neglecting the
child."'
Given the obviously important role that the constitutional rights issue played in the court's analysis, the specific
standards which the court established understandably place
a heavy burden on the State if it is to make out a case.
Exemplary of the standards was the court's holding that
abuse or neglect must pose a serious danger to the child's
physical or mental well-being before a court may terminate
parental rights. 9 Also it was established that the State must
show "clear and unequivocal" evidence of abuse and neglect
°
to justify termination of parental rights." The standards
will be discussed in-considerably more detail throughout the
following section.
law
37. Id. at 918. The court stated that it had not found support in the case
for a standard cast in terms of "strict scrutiny," but added that "where
courts have undertaken to terminate the parent-child relationship, the
scrutiny has, to say the least, in fact been strict," at 918. Selecting "strict
scrutiny" as a standard by which a trial judge is to evaluate evidence indeed
appears to be an unusual application of the concept. One should be cautioned
here to avoid confusing the court's use of the concept in XYZ with the more
typical application of "strict scrutiny" in the review of legislative classifications under the equal protection guarantee of the fourteenth amendment.
For a discussion of strict scrutiny as used in the latter context, see NowAK,
ROTUNDA, AND-YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 383-384 (1978).
38. Id. at 918.
39. Id. at 919.
40. id. at 918, 919.
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CRITIQUE OF THE DECISION

The Court's Mode of Analysis
The first question which should be considered in a
critique of the XYZ decision is how adequately the court
met its announced intention to establish guides and standards
to point the way in termination-of-parental-rights cases. As
will become evident in some of the discussion which follows,
the court's narrowing construction of the statutory language
clearly established certain parameters which should be helpful in promoting a consistent administration of the law. As
such, the court was relatively successful in accomplishing a
critical objective.
The standards which were promulgated are not entirely
satisfactory, however. At least part of this criticism might
have been avoided if the court had taken a different approach
in establishing its reasoning in support of the standards
which eventually emerged.
As will be recalled from the earlier discussion regarding
the court's analysis, the reasoning in the decision was
basically as follows:
Premise A:

Any infringement of a fundamental
liberty by a statute, (either on its
face or by its application), will be
subject to strict scrutiny."

Premise B:

The right to associate with one's
family has been recognized and is
recognized here as a fundamental
liberty. 2

Conclusion:

It follows that the trial judge trying
a. parental-rights-termination case
must strictly scrutinize a claim of
abuse or neglect before terminating
parental rights."3

41. Id. at 918.
42. Id. at 918, 919.
43. Id. at 918, 919.
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To require a trial judge to strictly scrutinize evidence
of abuse or neglect is indicative of the court's extreme
concern over the infringement of a fundamental liberty. But
in the context of XYZ and similar cases, saying that a trial
judge should apply strict scrutiny only implies that the
judge should take a "real hard look" at an allegation of
abuse and neglect before terminating parental rights. It
does not facilitate a determination of the specific kinds of
abuse or neglect that will justify the state's intervention,
nor does "strict scrutiny" in this context trigger a set of
predetermined parameters within which the standards must
fit.
Consequently, there is a regrettable gap in the court's
reasoning. An adequate foundation is laid in regard to the
parent's fundamental liberty. But the "strict scrutiny" concept does not link this fundamental liberty with the working
definitions of abuse and neglect which eventually emerge.
A better approach, and one that would provide the
continuity of reason lacking in the court's decision, would
have divided the analysis into two separate and distinct
issues. First, there is the general question of the procedural
due process which should be afforded to parents in terminating their parental rights. Of specific concern in this
regard is the standard of proof which the State must meet
in order to make out a case. Secondly, there is the substantive
matter of defining "abuse" and "neglect" in a manner that
is consistent with the procedural due process requirements.
Approaching the task of establishing guides and standards in this manner, the court could have started by recognizing that due process is flexible and calls for such
procedural protections as the particular situation demands."'
The initial concern thus would have been the ascertainment
of the nature of procedural protections that are demanded
when the State attempts to terminate a parent's rights to
custody of a child. As noted earlier, the procedural matter
44. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S..: 254,.-263 (1970)

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1981

11

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 16 [1981], Iss. 1, Art. 12

306

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XVI

of primary concern in XYZ was the evidentiary standard
to be applied in a termination-of-parental-rights proceeding.45
At this point in the analysis, the United States Supreme
Court's discussion of due process in Mathews v. Eldridge,46
would have provided particularly helpful guidelines. There,
the Court held that
identification of the specific dictates of due process
generally requires consideration of three distinct
factors: first, the private interest that will be
affected by the official action; second the risk of
an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any,
of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;
and finally, the Government's interest, including
the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.47
Applying these three factors to the XYZ situation
would have established a logical due process basis for the
clear and unequivocal evidence standard that the court
adopted.4 s First, the private interest-the parent's right to
the custody of his child-is without question an extremely
important interest. Secondly, the preponderance of the
evidence standard typically used in a civil proceeding may
result in an erroneous deprivation of the parent's interest,
and a substitute safeguard requirement of clear and unequivocal evidence is of probable value in avoiding such an
45. In Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979), the Court considered the standard of proof required by the fourteenth amendment in a civil proceeding
brought under state law to commit an individual involuntarily to a state
mental hospital. Relevant to this Note was the Court's statement that "even
if the particular standard-of-proof catch words do not always make a great
difference in a particular case, adopting a standard of proof is more than
an empty semantic exercise." In cases involving individual rights, whether
criminal or civil, '[t]he standard of proof [at a minimum] reflects the value
society places on individual liberty,'" at 425, citing Tippett v. Maryland,
436 F.2d 1153, 1166 (4th Cir. 1971) (Sobeloff, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
46. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
47. Id. at 335.
48. For a discussion regarding the burden of persuasion in civil cases and the
distinction between the "preponderance of the evidence" standard and "clear
and unequivocal evidence" see MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE, §§ 339, 340 (2nd ed.
1972). Also, see J. Rose writing for the court in Ramirez v._Metropolitan
Life .Ins._ Co., 580 P.2d 1136, 1141 (Wyo. 1978), in.which "clear and convincing proof" is referred to as a high degree of proof. _.
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error. Thirdly, the State's interest in its role as parens
patriaeis not significantly thwarted or burdened if a higher
standard of proof is required.
Grounding the evidentiary proof standard on procedural
due process would have been preferable to having the standard simply evolve from the trial judge's duty to "strictly
scrutinize" an allegation of abuse or neglect. Also, identifying the evidentiary standard as a procedural due process
matter and separating it as a distinct element of the guides
and standards the court promulgated would have facilitated
the task of establishing working definitions of "abuse" and
"neglect."
The court in XYZ held that "abuse" and "neglect" will
suffice under Section 14-2-301 only if the State produces
clear and unequivocal evidence that:
(a) Such abuse or neglect poses a serious danger to
the child's physical or mental well-being, i.e.,
clearly detrimental to the child ;4" or
(b) Such abuse consists of punishment which is not
only considered severe, but which also harms
the child;"0 or
(c) Such neglect consists of slovenliness in keeping
a young child clean or his home in good order,
but only if a serious health effect or risk is
implicated;5" or
(d) The child's health-mental or physical-and/or
his social or educational well-being has actually
been placed in jeopardy through the neglect or
abuse of the parent."
The guidelines regarding "abuse" and "neglect", like
the evidentiary standard of clear and unequivocal proof,
emerged from the court's view that allegations of a parent's
unfitness must be strictly scrutinized. If, instead of relying
on the strict scrutiny concept, the court had established that
49.
50.
51.
52.

XYZ, supra note 2, at 919.
Id..
Id.
1d.
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this narrowing construction of the "abuse" and "neglect"
terms was commensurate with the procedural due process
protections demanded in a termination-of-parental-rights
proceeding, there would have been a more logical and understandable basis for the standards, and a clearer connection
with the court's initial premise that a fundamental liberty
was at stake.
This criticism may be quibbling over labels and draftsmanship. The court's decision did arrive at a clear and
unequivocal evidence standard, 3 and the court's substantive
definitions of "abuse" and "neglect" are obviously compatible
with this requirement of a higher standard of proof. Nevertheless, the basis for the standards would have been more
precisely stated and more readily understood if the court
had developed the standards with a traditional procedural
due process analysis rather than using the "strict scrutiny"
concept as a cornerstone in its decision.
Parental Rights
It was earlier pointed out that a dilemma exists between
two competing approaches to the general question of deciding
child custody cases-the "parental rights" doctrine on the
one hand, and the "best interests of the child" on the other.
It was suggested that one might visualize the two doctrines
in their pure form at opposite ends of a continuum. Given
this scheme, it seems abundantly clear that the courts in
XYZ adopted a strict "parental rights" approach.
The court's harmonizing of the "abuse" and "neglect"
requirements of Sections 14-2-301 and 14-2-306(b), with
the "best interest" language of Section 14-2-306(a), immediately established its support of the "parental rights" doctrine. In the process of harmonizing the statutory provisions,
the court resolved that establishing "abuse" or "neglect" is
the threshold question, and the "best interest" language is
pertinent only insofar as it guides the couyt in its disposition
of a case once abuse or neglect is proven 4
53. Id.
54. Id. at 917.
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A second major step the court took in support of
"parental rights" involved its analysis of the constitutional
issues. The court's emphasis on the fundamental liberties of
the parents,5 5 its conclusion that a trial court must strictly
scrutinize a claim of abuse or neglect," and the "clear and
unequivocal evidence" standard," are all indicative of the
strong stance the court took in favor of "parental rights."
Those who disagree with the court's "parental rights"
orientation might heed the advice of one commentator who
notes, "considering the seriousness of the decision to intervene from the parents' perspective, intervention should only
be permissible where there is a clear-cut decision, openly
and deliberately made by responsible political bodies, that
the type of harm involved justifies intervention."58 The
Wyoming Statutes do not embody a "clear-cut decision" to
alter the traditional deference which has been afforded
parents in raising their children without interference from
the State. The court's decision in favor of "parental rights"
was in accordance with the legislative mandate, and if the
"best interests" notion is to gain ascendancy, it should be
through legislative change.
The Void for Vagueness Doctrine
Termination-of-parental-rights statutes have come under
attack in other states as being unconstitutionally void for
vagueness. 9 The Wyoming Statutes were not directly attacked in the XYZ decision on this basis and consequently,
the statutes' constitutionality was not a primary concern of
this Note. Nevertheless, developments in this area of the law
make it imperative to at least address the issue.
Vagueness attacks most often arise in a criminal context, but the Supreme Court has held that "civil" statutes
are susceptible to vagueness challenges as well.6" A challenge
55. Id. at 918, 919.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 919. See also Note, The Void For Vaguenesa Doctrine in the Supreme
Court, 109 U. OF PENN. L. REv. 67 (1960).
58. Wald, supra note 13 at 1002.
59. See, e.g., In the Matter of Five Minor Children, 407 A.2d 198 (Del. 1979);
Alsager v. District Court of Polk County, Iowa, 406 F. Supp. 10 (S.D. Iowa
1975), aff'd 545 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1976).
60. A.B. Small Co. v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 267 U.S. 233, 239 (1925).
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of vagueness stems from "the extraction of obedience to a
rule or standard which [is] so vague and indefinite as really
to be no rule or standard at all."'"
The United States Supreme Court has recently granted
review of a case, the outcome of which could have some
bearing on termination-of-parental-rights proceedings in
Wyoming.12 Doe v. Delaware is an appeal from a holding by
the Supreme Court of Delaware that the Delaware statute
regarding the termination of parental rights is not unconstitutional for vagueness. 3
The Delaware law provides that the State may terminate
parental rights if parents "are not fitted to exercise parental
rights."6 4 The parents contended that, by application of due
process standards, the statute is "unconstitutionally vague,
indefinite and overbroad." 5 The Delaware court held that
"unfitness does not require precise definition to be constitutionally sound.""6
If the United States Supreme Court finds the Delaware
statute unconstitutional, there is a possibility that the Wyoming statutes could also be susceptible to a vagueness attack.
61. Id. at 239.
62. Doe v. Delaware, 49 U.S.L.W. 3092 (U.S. August 26, 1980) (No. 79-5932).
63. In the Matter of Five Minor Children, supra note 59. Note the change in
case name on appeal to the Supreme Court to Doe v. Delaware, supra note 62.
64. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13 § 1103 (Supp. 1978).
Grounds for termination of parental rights. The procedure for termination
of parental rights for the purpose of adoption or, if a suitable adoption plan
cannot be effected, for the purpose of providing for the care of the child by
some other plan which may or may not contemplate the continued possibility
of eventual adoption, may be initiated whenever it appears that:
(1) The parent or parents of any child, or the person or persons or
organization holding parental rights over such child, desires to relinquish
such parental rights; or
(2) Any child has been abandoned; or
(3) The parent or parents of any child or any person or persons holding
parental rights over such a child are found by the Court to be mentally
incompetent and, from evidence of 2 qualified psychiatrists selected by the
Court, found to be unable to discharge parental responsibilities in the foreseeable future. The Court shall appoint a licensed attorney as guardian ad
litem to represent the alleged incompetent in the proceeding;
(4) The parent or parents of any such child, or any person or persons
or organization holding parental rights over such child are not fitted to
continue to exercise parental rights; or
(5) Both parents of a child are deceased.
Unless adoption is contemplated, the termination of 1 parent's parental
rights by the other parent shall not be granted if the effect will be to
leave only 1 parent holding parental rights, unless the Court shall find the
continuation of the rights to be terminated will be harmful to the child.
65. In the Matter of Five Minor Children, supra note 59 at 199.
66. Id. at 199 citing In the Matter of Three Minor Children, 406 A.2d 14 (Del.
1979).
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Given such a turn of events, the XYZ decision may be
extremely important in that the court's narrowing construction of the statutory language in XYZ may be sufficient to
save the statute from a finding that it is void for vagueness.
In Alsager v. District Court of Polk County, Iowa, the
parental termination statute of the Code of Iowa was found
to be unconstitutional because of vagueness."7 The decision
held that the parents were denied due process partially
because of the Iowa Supreme Court's failure to cure the
vagueness defects "either through a general narrowing construction in prior cases or by a specific narrowing construction in the Alsagers' own case." 8 Also in this regard, the
United States Supreme Court has held that statutes which
were susceptible to a finding of unconstitutionality for vagueness, or overbreadth, could be cured if a narrowing construction was given to the statutory language by the courts."9
Perhaps the "abuse" and "neglect" language of the
Wyoming statutes provides sufficient specificity, and is
therefore distinguishable as compared to Delaware's "unfitness to exercise parental rights" standard. The Supreme
Court's upcoming decision in Doe v. Delaware will nontheless be of interest to persons involved with termination-ofparental-rights proceedings in Wyoming, particularly if
the Court establishes certain parameters within which a
termination-of-parental-rights statute must exist in order
to satisfy procedural due process requirements. Whatever
the impact of Doe v. Delaware on Wyoming law, the void
for vagueness doctrine should illustrate the importance of
the court's attempt in XYZ to tighten up the statutory
language.
67. Alsager v. District Court of Polk County, Iowa, supra note 59.
68. Id. at 21. The judgment appealed from in the Alsager case was affirmed by
the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals, but not on the basis of the facial invalidity
of the statute. By declining to affirm on this ground, the court noted that
it was giving the Iowa courts "an additional opportunity to give the statutory provisions a plainly desirable limiting construction," Alsager v. District
Court of Polk County, Iowa, 545 F.2d 1137, 1138 (8th Cir. 1976).
69. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104. 111-112 (1972) (vagueness) and
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973) (overbreadth).
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CONCLUSION

The court's decision in XYZ to establish standards to
be utilized in termination-of-parental-rights proceedings was
a welcome step. Standards were sorely needed in light of the
critical questions involved and the absence of any real guidance from the statutes or from case precendent.
While some criticism may be directed at the court's
mode of analysis in XYZ, the real measure of the court's
success must relate to how well it met its objective of defining
"guides and standards-to point the way in this and future
cases." The court's message that parental rights are not to
be trifled with comes through loud and clear. The extent to
which the court was successful in accomplishing its ultimate
objective, however, will depend upon how understandable
and workable the standards are at the trial level.
Prior to this decision, as was stated in In the Matter
of C.M., no two cases of this type were alike and each was
to be decided on its own individual facts."0 Adjudicating
important issues such as a parent's rights to the custody of
his child should not be done on an ad hoc basis. It places an
unfair burden on all parties involved, and particularly the
trial judge who is expected to exercise the wisdom of Solomon.
In narrowing the discretionary aspects of the termination
process and promulgating principles to guide in the resolution
of the issues, the court in the XYZ decision took an important
step in rejecting this ad hoc approach.
As a final note, it might be pointed out that whether
or not one agrees with the court's strong stand in favor of
parental rights, at least a standard now exists upon which
a debate can focus if change is desired. If legislative changes
are contemplated, the United States Supreme Court's resolution of the Doe v. Delaware case should be consulted prior
to their implementation.
SIDNEY L. MOLLER
70. Matter of C.M., supra note 18, at 519.
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